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 Abstract 
 Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was exclusively exercised by 
administrative bodies (or the chief of state).  However, recent studies pointed out that the present 
legislative bodies have come to play a more active role through ratification or the review of 
treaties in European and American countries.  Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in 
British dominions and criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a 
“democratic deficit” due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by 
international agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained.  These studies indicated 
that people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but 
neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such procedures 
were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the 
legislative and political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 
constitution as a case study. 
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Introduction 
 
International treaties bind not only the rights and obligations of contracting 
states, but also those of the individuals who live within them.  However, unlike 
domestic laws, which require legislative approval, international treaties are not 
necessarily subject to ratification by the legislative body.  
 This provokes the question of how the interests of the people are reflected in 
international treaties.  Historically, the authority to conclude international treaties was 
exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state).  However, a 
comparative study of the treaty-making process by Riesenfeld and Abbott (1994) 
approvingly pointed out that the present legislative bodies have come to play a more 
active role through ratification or the review of treaties in European and American 
countries.  Harrington (2005) studied judicial reform in British dominions and 
criticized the past executive-dominant treaty-making process as a “democratic deficit” 
due to a fear that under this system the nation might be bound by international 
agreements for which a consensus had not been obtained.  These studies indicated that 
people’s participation in the treaty-making process has increased on a global basis, but 
neither of them provides sufficient descriptive evidence regarding why and how such 
procedures were established. The present paper therefore attempts to solve these 
questions by analyzing the legislative and political process of the treaty-making 
procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution as a case study.   
 
 
１．Review of Studies on the Treaty-making Procedure 
Generally, treaties enter into force in domestic jurisdiction after they are 
incorporated into the domestic law system.  There are two types of approach 
concerning incorporation. One is called the doctrine of transformation. This doctrine 
regards that treaties must be expressly and specifically ‘transformed’ into domestic law 
by the use of the appropriate constitutional machinery. This doctrine grew from the 
procedure whereby international agreements are rendered operative in domestic law 
through the device of ratification by the sovereign, and the idea has developed from this 
 
 
 
2 
 
that any rule of international law must be transformed, or specifically adopted in order 
to be valid within the internal legal order.  Another approach, known as the doctrine of 
incorporation, holds that international law is automatically part of domestic law without 
the necessity for the interposition of a constitutional ratification procedure (Shaw [2003: 
128-129). Especially a treaty which provides adequate rules by which given rights may 
be enjoyed or duties imposed is regarded as being immediately and automatically 
enforceable (a self-executing treaty). However, the problem of what kind of treaty 
should be incorporated in this way is usually solved under the domestic law of each 
country.   In any case, we can say that effectuation of international law (a treaty) is 
strongly dependent on domestic legislation procedure.  
The problem of incorporation has been regarded as a part of the discussion about the 
order between the domestic and international legal system. However, the increasing 
demand for democratic institution-building has caused recent studies to focus on the 
distribution of power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches in the 
treaty-making process.  As this paper has already mentioned, in history, treaty-making 
power was exclusively exercised by administrative bodies (or the chief of state). 
However, in the majority of parliamentary democratic systems today, with some 
exceptions, international treaties which have been proposed, negotiated and signed by 
the executive branch often require deliberation and ratification by legislative bodies. 
Under such a system, it is necessary to specify in advance what kind of treaty 
requires the approval of parliament in order to conduct both international relations and 
national governance smoothly and effectively.  In Japan, for example, treaties 
concerning the legislative power of the Diet or public finance, and treaties dealing with 
international relations are regarded as legislative treaties.1
                                                 
 
 
1 Response by the Director-general of the Treaties Bureau at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House 
of Representatives, 46th Diet Ordinary Session 18th March, 1964. As a consensus of the government on 
this matter, see the response by Masayoshi Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House of Representatives, 72nd Diet Ordinary Session.  
 On the other hand, in the 
United States, the law of nations is traditionally deemed to be incorporated into the 
national law system without legislation by the Congress or declaration by the president.  
However, Damrosh pointed out the fact that the legislative branch (U.S. Senate, in this 
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case) often defined the non-self-executing character of treaties by declaration and 
indicated that those declarations are binding on the courts (Damrosch 1996).2 Although 
Damrosch regards the Senate as having constitutional authority to control the self-
executing/non-self-executing character of a treaty, she argues that the Senate should 
refrain from exercising that power from the viewpoint of the separation of powers of 
three branches of government.3
On the contrary, Harrington’s work criticizes the traditional executive branch-
centric treaty-making process as a system with a “democratic deficit” (Harrington 2005).  
As we have seen above, treaties are not necessarily ratified by the legislative body.  
Moreover, Harrington pointed out that the federal government usually concludes 
international treaties without the consent of local governments.  “Democratic deficit” 
is a concept which criticizes the treaty-making system whereby the will and interests of 
the people as the sovereign can be ignored.  Harrington took up the cases of treaty-
making process reform in Canada, England and Australia, countries which claim to 
have corrected this “deficit.”  In Canada, for example, the practice of submitting all 
treaties to Parliament before signing had been in place since 1926. After the mid 1960s, 
however, not a small number of cases in which the treaties have been enacted at 
executive discretion, without ratification, have occurred (Harrington 2005: 480-481).     
  
Referring to the case in the British Parliament, Harrington criticized this situation 
and suggested that the executive branch should disclose sufficient information about 
treaties in the legislative body.  Incidentally, the British Parliament recently 
experienced further reform of the treaty-making procedure. There was a constitutional 
convention called the Ponsonby Rule whereby every treaty signed by the United 
Kingdom and subject to ratification should be laid before Parliament for 21 sitting days 
(although they need not be continuous).  However, the Ponsonby Rule does not apply 
to treaties that enter into force on signature. Moreover, even if either House rejects the 
                                                 
 
 
2 In her paper, Damrosh refers to the case of the Torture Convention and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Damrosh 1996).  
3 Riesenfeld and Abbott agree with Damrosch’s claim, although they do not regard the Senate as having 
the constitutional authority to control whether a treaty is self-executing or not (Riesenfeld and Abbott 
1996: 3).   
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treaty, this is not legally binding.  On 11th November 2010, the Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Act 2010 was brought into force by a commencement order. Part 2 of 
the Act deals with the ratification of treaties and puts Parliamentary scrutiny of treaties 
on a statutory footing, effectively replacing the Ponsonby Rule. This made it illegal to 
conclude a treaty against a resolution of the House of Commons (Kawashima [2010]). 
The abovementioned studies depict the recent tendency for the legislative scrutiny 
of treaty-making to become more active.  However, neither of them provides sufficient 
descriptive evidence on why and how such procedures were aspired to and established. 
This paper therefore attempts to solve these questions by analyzing the legislative and 
political process of the treaty-making procedure reform in Thailand’s 2007 constitution 
as a case study.   
As well as Britain, Thailand has recently experienced a reform of the treaty-making 
procedure. Section 190 of the 2007 constitution newly created stronger measures to 
control the government’s authority to conclude international treaties.  It expanded the 
range of treaties which require the approval of parliament. Moreover, it enhanced not 
only the authority of the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court, but also 
provided opportunities for direct participation in the treaty-making process by the 
people. This evokes the nationwide discussion about the balance of the three 
governmental powers in treaty-making in Thailand.    
There are a small number of studies about the treaty-making process in Thailand. 
Jaturon (1996) analyzed the treaty-making procedures in Thailand under the previous 
1997 (2540) constitution. In this work he offered rich information about the situation 
before the reform in 2007. On the other hand, Jumphot (2009) is a study about the new 
procedure and its legal and political influence. Comparing the contents of Section 190 
of the 2007 constitution, which provides for the new treaty-making procedure, with that 
of other countries, Jumphot pointed out that the 2007 constitution gives the legislative 
branch the power not only to monitor but also to control the treaty-making power of the 
executive branch. He expressed concern over possible trouble regarding the 
implementation of international law (treaties) which might be caused by domestic law 
(the constitution). (Jumphot [2009 200-201]). The information and analytical 
frameworks of the research by Jaturon and Jumphot are seen to be of value in studying 
the question of the distribution of power in treaty-making process reform.  In passing, 
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the present paper also refers to works about treaty-making practice written by diplomats 
as important sources of information. Visoot [1990] and Krom sonthisanya [2004] are 
manuals for the staff of the Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (referred to as DTA-MFA) and are rich in information about the actual 
procedure and past cases, which are not written in the relevant laws.     
Let us first examine the features of the reform of the 2007 constitution. This paper 
historically reviews Thailand’s treaty-making procedures as stipulated in past 
constitutions and compares them with those of the present time. The paper then traces 
the behavior of the relevant actors in the drafting process of the 2007 constitution and 
scrutinizes their motivations and purposes.  
 
 
2.  Treaty-making Procedures in Past Constitutions, 1932-1997. 
     The first written rule about treaty-making was seen in the Constitution of the 
Siam Kingdom which was promulgated in 1932 (B.E. 2475). Section 54 of the 1932 
constitution specified that;   
 
The king has the prerogative of declaring war, concluding a peace treaty and other 
treaties with other countries  
The declaration of war which was provided for in the preceding paragraph is 
exercised when it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the League of Nations 
Covenant. 
A treaty which provides for a change in the territories of the Kingdom of Siam or 
requires the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the 
National Assembly (English translation by the author).  
 
In the process of Constitution drafting, there was discussion about the definition of a 
legislative treaty.  It is noteworthy that they agreed to confine legislative treaties to 
those stipulated in paragraph three of section 54 for the reason that submission of all the 
treaties to the Assembly would exert an inordinate burden on the government (Record 
[1932: 150-154]).  Thus Thai constitutions have basically followed the definition in 
the 1932 constitution. For example, the 1946 Constitution provided that, 
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 Section 76 
The king has the prerogative of concluding a peace treaty and other treaties 
with other countries. 
A treaty which provides for a change in the territories of the Kingdom of 
Thailand or requires the enactment of an act for its implementation must be approved 
by the National Assembly (English translation by the author).  
 
This section was inherited by the constitutions of 1949 (section 154) and of 1968 
(section 150).  Explicit and detailed discussion over the reason for limiting the 
definition of a legislative treaty was seen in the record of the drafting of the 1978 
constitution.  In the deliberations, one of the members suggested that peace and truce 
accords be added to the section providing for legislative treaties “in order to prevent 
the government betraying the country intentionally against the interests of the nation.” 
Another member countered this opinion by raising the objection that this might 
encumber the government’s swift response to the situation. They also argued that it is 
not necessary to prescribe these accords in the section because even if the government 
is obliged under the truce to cede a part of Thai territory, the implementation of this 
would require approval by the National Assembly, as is already stipulated in the 
second paragraph of the section. They also discussed the status of military conventions 
and concluded that these should be exempted from the definition of legislative treaty, 
because “awaiting the ratification process might hamper the government’s prompt 
response to the emergency. Moreover, some treaties are highly confidential due to the 
nature of the issue and disclosing the contents in the Assembly might make 
implementation of this impossible” (Sawasdikan 1988: 317-318).   
Thus the past discussion about which treaties would require ratification show that 
importance was placed on the efficiency of administrative management and delegated 
treaty-making powers to the executive branch.4
                                                 
 
 
4 For an actual case of a treaty’s enactment without ratification for the reason that it was highly political 
and confidential, Jaturon mentioned the memorandum concerning usage of military bases in Thai 
territory by the U.S. Military which was undertaken between the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Thanat Khoman and the U.S. Secretary of State David Dean Rask on 6th March 1962 (Jaturon [1996: 
44]). 
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On the other hand, the 1978 constitution added a new item to the category of 
legislative treaty.   
 
Section 162  
The king has the prerogative of concluding a peace treaty and other 
treaties with other countries or international organizations. 
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or the national 
territorial sovereignty or requires the enactment of an Act for its implementation 
must be approved by the National Assembly5
      
.  
 
“The national territorial sovereignty” is an expression reflecting the notion of “exclusive 
economic zone,” which was newly established in the third Law of the Sea Convention 
in 1973. This section again was inherited in the constitutions of 1991, (section 178) and 
of 1997 (224). As we shall see later, this obscure wording caused a political 
confrontation over the constitutionality of the memorandum concerning the territorial 
problem between Cambodia and Thailand.     
So far, this paper has reviewed the development of the rules concerning legislative 
treaties in past constitutions. It seems appropriate to remark that there was no 
substantial change until 2007. Recalling the Thai history of democratization, in which 
upheavals were experienced in the mid 1970s and again in the 1990s, it is surprising 
that the treaty-making provisions had been left almost untouched.  Even in the 1997 
constitution, which was drafted as “the most democratic constitution in Thai history” 
after the political turmoil of “Black May” in 1992, Section 224 provides that;  
 
The King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice and 
other treaties with other countries or international organizations.  
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or the 
jurisdiction of the State or requires the enactment of an Act for its implementation 
must be approved by the National Assembly.6
                                                 
 
 
5 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand A.D. 1978, International Translations, Bangkok 1978 
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 In fact, most of Thailand’s treaty-making procedures, from negotiation to 
enactment, had been managed by the bureaucrats of DTA-MFA and legal specialists.  
For example, the cabinet decision of 18th December 1977 approved the delegation of the 
conclusion and approval of treaties concerning non-political or practical matters to the 
prime minister or vice premier or their surrogates. Another decision (on 6th March 1979 
and on 27th July 1992) appointed MFA as responsible for treaty-making in general and 
for the organization of teams to conduct international negotiations. In an interview with 
the author, Jaturon pointed out the role of the Special Committee for Consideration of 
Legal Issues Relating to Treaties and Conventions, which was established in the DTA-
MFA. According to Jaturon, it was the ad-hoc committee, consisting of members such 
as the Justice of the Supreme Court and of Court Appeals, the Director-General of the 
Council of State, the Attorney General, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Director-General and Vice Director-General of DTA-MFA, which 
examined the legal consistency and social impact of treaties (Jaturon [1996:49]). 
According to a bureaucrat interviewed by the author, it was explained that committee 
members were appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs based on their ability and 
personal connection with the Minister.7
 
  However, the committee ceased activities in 
the 1990s because of the retirement of the members due to advanced age, and DTA-
MFA assumed its function.  From these documents and oral evidence, we can remark 
that Thai treaty-making procedures had been managed mainly by the executive branch, 
giving priority to the efficiency of administrative and diplomatic management.    
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
6 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (B.E. 2540), 11 October 1997, URL: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b5b2b.html, Last accessed 8th June 2012]) 
7 Interview with a bureaucrat of DTA-MFA on 15th February 2010. 
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3.  Reform of the Treaty-making Procedure in the 2007 Constitution 
1) The features of Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution 
The 2007 constitution fundamentally changed the conventional treaty-making 
procedures that we have reviewed in the previous chapter.  Section 190 of 2007 
constitution provides that, 
 
The King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice and 
other treaties with other countries or international organizations.  
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or the 
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or has 
jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in accordance with international law or 
requires the enactment of an Act for the implementation thereof or has 
extensive impacts on national economic or social security or generates material 
commitments in trade, investment or budgets or the country, must be approved 
by the National Assembly. For this purpose, the National Assembly shall 
complete its consideration within sixty days as from the receipt of such matter.  
Prior to taking steps in concluding a treaty with other countries or 
international organizations under paragraph two, the Council of Ministers shall 
provide information and cause to be conducted public hearings and shall give 
the national Assembly explanations on such treaty. For this purpose, the 
Council of Ministers shall submit to the National Assembly a framework for 
negotiations for approval. 
When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the Council of 
Ministers shall, prior to the declaration of intention to be bound thereby, make 
details thereof publicly accessible and, in the case where the implementation of 
such treaty has impacts on the public or operators of small- or medium-sized 
enterprises, the Council of Ministers shall take steps in rectifying or remedying 
the impacts suffered by aggrieved persons in an expeditious, appropriate and 
fair manner.  
There shall be the law on the determination of procedures and 
methods for the conclusion of treaties having extensive impacts on national 
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economic or social security or generating material commitments in trade or 
investment and the rectification and remedying of impacts suffered by persons 
in consequence of the implementation of such treaties, having regard to justice 
to persons benefited and persons aggrieved by the implementation thereof as 
well as to general members of the public. 
In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, 
the power to make the determination thereon shall be vested in the 
Constitutional Court and, for this purpose, the provisions of section 154 (1) 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the referral of the matter to the Constitutional 
Court.8
 
 
The section drastically expanded the definition of treaties requiring legislative 
approval, adding treaties which have “extensive impacts on national economic or social 
security or generate(s) material commitments in trade, investment or budgets or the 
country.” Furthermore, it reformed not only the definition of legislative treaty but also 
the procedures themselves. The Figure 1 shows the flow of treaty-making procedures 
provided by the 2007 constitution.  
The figure shows that the 2007 constitution put the negotiation process under 
direct public scrutiny by mandating information disclosure at the pre-negotiation and 
pre-signatory phase. Moreover, Section 190, paragraph six stipulates granting the power 
of judicial review to the Constitutional Court. Another noteworthy point is that it 
provides for legislation of enforcement law pertaining treaty-making procedures in 
paragraph five of section 190.  The actual measure, which is called “The Bill 
concerning Treaty-making Procedure and Process, B. E. ….” (Referred to as the Treaty-
making Procedure Bill) was drafted immediately after the effectuation of the 2007 
constitution.  The bill was submitted to the National Assembly by the cabinet of Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in March 2009 and was expected to be enacted within the 
                                                 
 
 
8 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007), Bureau of Committee 3, The Secretariat of 
the House of Representatives, URL: http://www.senate.go.th/th_senate/English/constitution2007.pdf. 
last accessed on 10th June 2012. 
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month. However, it has not yet been established since it was withdrawn due to great 
opposition from the opposition party.  
Nevertheless, the feature of the treaty-making procedure under the 2007 
constitution can be summarized as placing strong restrictions on the treaty-making 
powers of the executive branch in the form of checks by the legislative branch, national 
scrutiny and by judicial review.  
 
2)  Politics in the Legislative Process of Section 190 
   Let us now see how and in what circumstances Section 190 was established. 
What is most interesting for us about the legislative process of Section 190 of the 2007 
constitution is that it was promoted not only by the government agencies and jurists but 
also by civic groups. NGOs such as the consumer’s group Munlanithi puea 
phuboriphok and a farmer’s group Munlanithi khaokhwan have worked together as an 
NGO network, FTA Watch, and have actively expressed opinions about treaty-making 
procedures through mass media or demonstrations since 2007. Originally, their actions 
began as a protest against the free trade agreement (FTA) policy of Thaksin 
Shinnawatra’s government (2001-06). They then turned their eyes to the opacity of the 
treaty-making procedures, which allowed little room for legislative or public 
examination and launched appeals to reform these procedures by drafting a new 
constitution.9
 Moreover, since they had expressed their dissatisfaction with the draft 
constitution by the Constitution Drafting Committee suggested in April 2007, FTA 
Watch suggested their own draft of the section pertaining to treaty-making.
 
10
                                                 
 
 
9 See the declaration titled “ Thalaengkan reuang botbanyat nai ratthathamanun waduai kantham 
nanseusanya rawang prathet tongyuenyan lakkan thuang duntruwatshp rawang amnat fainitibanyat fai 
borihan lae phak prachachon pheua fa wikrot thang tan thangsethakit lae sangkom 9 mesayon 2550
（Declaration of the opinion that the provision in the constitution pertaining to international treaty-
making should balance the powers among executive, legislature and the people in order to resolve the 
socio-economic turmoil on 9th April, B.E. 2550  (2007).  URL: http://www.thaingo.org/cgi-
bin/content/content3/show.pl?0785.  Last downloaded on 10th June 2012. 
  The 
10 From an FTA Watch internal document titled “Rang khong khanakamathikan yokrang matra 186 (19 
mesayon 2550)，Rang tamkhosanue khong phak prachachon matra 186 (24 mesayon 2550) (Section 
186 of the Draft Constitution by Constitution Drafting Committee (24th April B.E. 2550) and Sec. 186 
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second paragraph of section 190, providing that a treaty which “has extensive impacts 
on national economic or social security or generates material commitments in trade, 
investment or budgets or the country, must be approved by the National Assembly” was 
incorporated from the draft by FTA Watch after deliberations in the First Sub-
committee of the Constitution Drafting Committee on 11th May, 2007 (Khana 
annukammathikan [2007]). 
Behind this, Dr. Somkhit Lertpaitpong of Thammasat University, a member of the 
Drafting Committee, pointed out the connection with the political conflict among Thai 
society over the Thaksin administration’s FTA policy.11
With this situation in mind, the Surayudh Chulanont government, formed after the 
Thaksin government was overthrown, initiated a policy of disclosing a part of the FTA 
negotiation process to the public. For example, a committee to consider compensation 
for possible damage to small- and medium-sized enterprises and farmers which could be 
caused by an FTA was established in November 2006. This was followed by a public 
hearing on the Thailand-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) held in 
December.  
  Aiming to boost 
competitiveness of the Thai economy, Thaksin proactively pursued FTAs with countries 
such as the U.S., Japan, China and Australia. The FTA negotiations were expedited by 
bureaucrats, representatives of business associations or big companies led by Thaksin’s 
advisors (Aoki [2008]). An opposition movement by NGOs and farmers developed 
against this negotiation style from around 2004.  The movement insisted that it is not 
“democratic” to negotiate FTAs without offering the nation opportunities for hearings 
and exchanges of opinions, since the treaties may have possible negative effects on their 
lives. In January 2005, ten thousand people from the anti-globalist NGO, the farmer’s 
group and a support group for HIV-infected persons held a rally in Chiangmai to 
demonstrate against the Thailand-US FTA negotiations. 
                                                                                                                               
 
 
of the Draft Constitution submitted by the representatives from the private sector)” referred to the 
Drafting Committee by courtesy of Mr. Bunthoon Sethasirote.    
11 Interview with the author conducted at Thammasat University on 18th February 2010. 
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Considering this background, Dr. Somkhit explained to the author that the 
Constitution Drafting Committee decided to draft the third and fourth paragraphs of 
Section 190 in order to make the treaty-making system open to the public not only in 
the ratification phase, but also during negotiations.  By providing an opportunity for 
public discussion in the pre-negotiation phase, the government would be able to reflect 
the interests of the people regarding the treaty. At the same time, this would enable the 
government to avoid serious conflict during the ratification process in the National 
Assembly.   
However, there still remained the problem of to whom the power to judge the 
constitutionality of the treaty-making procedure belongs.   This was at one time 
highlighted in the case of an injunction demand on the signing of the JTEPA by the 
consumer’s association and the farmer’s group of Thailand in March 2007.  The 
Central Administrative Court, which received the demand, rejected the judgment 
concerning constitutionality stating that it was a matter beyond their authority.  In 
order to avoid such a situation, Dr. Somkhit explained, the Constitution Drafting 
Committee drafted Section 190, paragraph six, which authorizes judicial review power 
to the Constitutional Court.  
 
 
3.  Politics over the Treaty-making Procedure under the 2007 Constitution 
 
1) Constitutional Reform  
The reform of Section 190 of the 2007 constitution was an epoch-making event in 
the history of Thai treaty-making procedures. However, a demand for a constitutional 
amendment arose in the National Assembly only two years after its enactment.  
Originally, the idea for a constitutional amendment was suggested in the meeting 
for national reconciliation organized by the Cairman of the National Assembly (held in 
April 2009) as a part of the measures against the national confrontation that had taken 
place since the coup in 2006. Then, in September 2009, a six-pronged draft of the 
constitutional amendment was submitted to the Assembly, in which Section 190 was 
included (Khanakammakan samanachan [2009:40]). The draft faced serious resistance 
from both the opposition and the ruling parties because it included critical issues for 
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politicians, such as abolition of the provision concerning party dissolution, reform of the 
constituency system and procedure for elections to the Senate, abolition of the ban on 
the concurrent holding of double offices and on participation in other public sectors.  
After a four-month controversy, the ruling coalition, except for the Democrats (the 
largest ruling party), submitted a draft amendment of Sections190 and 94 (a provision 
concerning measures for the selection of members to the House of Representatives) to 
the National Assembly Chairman with signatures of one hundred and two members of 
the parties.  
Together with the draft by the one hundred and two Representatives, a draft by 
Thaksin’s supporter’s group, National United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship 
(UDD), and a further draft by the Democrats and other ruling parties called the 
“Government’s Version” were also submitted. Of these, only the Government’s Version 
passed the First Reading conducted at the Joint Sitting of the National Assembly held 
on 23rd November 2010.  
The Table 1 compares the section pertaining to treaty-making procedures in the 
Government’s Version of the draft amendment and that of the 2007 constitution.  The 
aims of the Government’s Version amendment can seemingly be summarized into two 
points; to narrow the definition of a legislative treaty and to clarify the range of the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.  As the table shows, the definition of a 
legislative treaty is limited to pacts concerning a change of Thai territory (or 
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or has jurisdiction) in 
government’s draft amendment (the second and third paragraph). A narrower definition 
for legislative treaties means less power to the legislative branch in the treaty-making 
process. On the other hand, the draft specifies the range of the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction more precisely, or rather, even more narrowly (the seventh paragraph).  
While paragraph six of the 2007 Constitution can be interpreted as vesting the 
Constitutional Court with the authority to review almost all treaties, paragraph seven in 
the government’s draft seemingly attempts, in paragraphs two and three, the 
interpretation that there are treaties which remain beyond the Court’s jurisdiction and 
outside the definition. Thus the power distribution among the three governmental 
branches in treaty-making was changed within the short span of only two years. In the 
following section, let us examine the background to this change.     
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2)  The Influence of the Territorial Dispute over Preah Vihear Temple  
 
 In mid June 2008, the foreign ministers of Thailand and Cambodia issued a joint 
communiqué regarding Preah Vihear Temple, an ancient ruin located on the border 
between the two countries. In the communiqué, they confirmed three points; 
Cambodia’s formal and single inscription of the ruin on the World Heritage List at the 
32nd session of the World Heritage Committee in 2008, Thailand’s support for it, and 
the fact that this had no effect on the inscription on the demarcation of the countries’ 
common border around the ruin.12
 This was followed by the opinion submitted at the end of the month to the Thai 
Constitutional Court by two hundred and twenty eight members of the National 
Assembly, in which they required the Court’s judgment on whether the joint 
communiqué would violate Section 190 paragraph 2 of the 2007 constitution or not. The 
Constitutional Court accepted the opinion and initiated a review, focusing on the points 
of whether or not the joint communiqué meets the definition of a “treaty,” and if it is 
deemed as a “treaty,” whether or not it falls under the classification of a legislative 
treaty as stipulated in Section 190 paragraph 2 of the 2007 constitution.  Noppadon 
Pattama, the Minister of Foreign Affairs who signed the communiqué, argued in the 
hearing that the communiqué cannot be deemed a “treaty” in the light of Section 2, 
paragraph 1 a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 because it was a 
memo of the meeting which indicated no intention to conclude an international treaty, 
and was not an agreement in written form.
 Furthermore, the ministers agreed to submit a plan 
on co-management of the disputed territory around the ruin to UNESCO by 2010.  
Although Preah Vihear Temple and its surrounding territory was internationally 
regarded as belonging to Cambodia based on a ruling of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in 1962, the Thai government had retained its right to claim sovereignty.  
13
                                                 
 
 
12 See, Joint Communiqué by H.E. Mr. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in charge of the Office 
of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and H.E. Mr. Noppadon Pattama, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, 18th June 2008, Phnom Penh.    
 He further argued that the communiqué 
13 Actually, Thailand has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention. However, in the judicial review of 1999 
on whether or not the letter of intent which the Thai government submitted to the International 
Monetary Fund was deemed a legislative treaty, the Constitutional Court ruled that it did not fall 
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does not fall under the classification of a treaty requiring legislative approval in Section 
190 paragraph 2, citing the reason that it is not an agreement whereby the parties 
intended to change Thai territory, and accepted the ICJ’s 1962 ruling (Jumphot [2009: 
257-258]). Against this, the Constitutional Court ruled that the communiqué can be 
deemed a “treaty” falling under the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties for the 
reason that “when a joint communiqué does not provide within itself to be included in 
the domestic law of either party, (the communiqué) should be under international law.” 
The court also ruled that the communiqué meets the definition of legislative treaty given 
in Section 190 because “A treaty with the potential to provide for a change in the 
territories of Thailand or the extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign 
rights or has jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in accordance with international 
law must be approved by the National Assembly.”14
The ruling of the Constitutional Court caused a deterioration in the bilateral 
relationship between Cambodia and Thailand. In early May, Thai newspapers reported 
on “the deal” between the governments of Cambodia and Thailand in which the Thai 
side “bought” an oil concession in Cambodia with recognition of Cambodia’s 
sovereignty over disputed territory.
               
15
As a result of this, Foreign Minister Noppadon and the Director General of DTA-
MFA were forced out of their posts. In addition, the Constitutional Courts’ ruling could 
be literally interpreted as meaning that almost all international agreements can be 
“treaties” before being incorporated into domestic jurisdiction, and that treaties merely 
  This provoked popular hostility toward 
Cambodia and demonstrations against the Thai government. Since the government at 
that time was led by Prime Minister Samak Sundravej, who once claimed himself to be 
the successor to Thaksin, the anti-Thaksin group People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD) fiercely condemned the government as a traitor that sold Thai territory to 
Cambodia. The Constitutional Court’s ruling fueled this patriotic campaign and it 
eventually led to a military clash near Preah Vihear Temple in October of that year.   
                                                                                                                               
 
 
under the definition of a treaty in the light of the Vienna Convention from the position that the 
Convention had became a part of international custom. See the Constitutional Court Ruling 11/2542, 
on 25th May 1999.  
14 See the Constitutional Court Ruling 6-7/2551 on 8th July 2008. 
15 It was not confirmed that this “deal” had actually taken place.  
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with “the potential” to bring about a change in Thai territories or the extraterritorial 
areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or has jurisdiction require the approval 
of the National Assembly. Recalling the fact that the Treaty-making Procedure Bill, 
which is the law for enforcement of Section 190 of the 2007 constitution, we can say 
that the only concrete definition of a legislative treaty in Thailand is the ruling of 
Constitutional Court on the case of the territorial dispute over Preah Vihear Temple. 
  The case revealed the problem that the 2007 constitution vested greater power 
in the judicial branch over treaty-making, while the detailed rules for enforcement had 
been left absent. A staff member of MFA told the author that the bureaucrats declined to 
judge on their own which treaties require legislative approval, and began to submit 
almost all treaties directly to the National Assembly.16
In the National Assembly, a meeting of the Sub-committee for Constitutional 
Amendment was held in July 2010. In the meeting, a jurist member emphasized that 
amendment of Section 190 paragraph 2 is not possible without enactment of the Treaty-
making Procedure Bill (Khanaanukammakan phicharana naeothang [2010: 5-6]). 
However, as this paper has already mentioned in section 1) of Chapter 3, the bill was 
rejected with great opposition during the deliberations in the joint sitting of the National 
Assembly in March 2009.  DTA-MFA then revised the bill and it was approved in the 
Cabinet meeting held on 3rd February 2010, in which the opinion from the non-
governmental sector was incorporated, according to DTA-MFA staff.
 In this situation, the government 
suggested urgent enactment of the Treaty-making Procedure Bill, together with an 
amendment of the 2007 constitution itself.  
17
Amendment of the 2007 constitution appears to have been a fallback to the 
“ancient regime” in which the power of treaty-making was appropriated exclusively by 
the executive branch. However, it should be emphasized that the amendment was 
pursued along with the development of enforcement law. Moreover, what is important 
about the Treaty-making Procedure Bill is that it was supported and promoted by non-
governmental actors such as FTA Watch.  The group drafted their own version of the 
   
                                                 
 
 
16 An interview at DTA-MFA on 16th February 2010.       
17 See footnote 16 
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Treaty-making Procedure Bill, and handed ten thousand signatures supporting their 
version to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.18
     
 They also tried to submit their draft law 
directly to the National Assembly. Although the draft was not accepted, their active 
involvement in the legislative process of the bill could seemingly no longer be ignored 
by the bureaucrats or the cabinet.    
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus far, this paper has presented the main points of Thailand’s treaty-making 
procedures, and examined the process of their reform in the 2007 constitution.  
To summarize the purpose of Section 190, it is to establish a procedure which 
limits the power of the executive and reflects the interests of the people with respect to 
international treaties.  The Section expanded the power of the legislative branch by 
drastically expanding the definition of a legislative treaty, afforded opportunities such 
as public hearings for wider participation by the people in the treaty-making process, 
and vested greater authority in the judicial branch in the form of a judicial review by the 
Constitutional Court. As we have seen in section one of this paper, there are some cases 
in the world in which the government informs parliament of the content of a treaty 
before ratification.  However, Thailand’s case is quite unique in the sense that public 
hearings are held before negotiations.      
Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution was drafted in the wake of the political 
dispute over the Thaksin administration’s FTA policy. An FTA is a treaty which 
requires reform of the domestic regulations on trade in goods and services. When the 
people became aware of its impacts on their lives, they turned their focus to the absence 
of a system by which they could have their interests reflected in the treaty. In that sense, 
we can conclude that the reform of the Thai treaty-making procedure was led by 
                                                 
 
 
18 See the article on FTA Watch’s website, titled “Kamnod anakhod thai yud look kaphiwad 10,000 chew 
ruamsanue kotmai sanya rawang prathet chabap prachachon (Determine the future of Thailand. 
Stop globalization. Signatures of Ten thousand people supporting International Treaty-making Bill 
(People’s version), 13th March, 2008, URL: http://www.ftawatch.org/node/18078.  Last accessed 
on 14th June, 2012. 
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consumers, farmers and small to medium producers and enterprises who were affected 
(or rather, supposed to be affected) by globalization, with the involvement of jurists and 
government agencies. Yanai (1991) once argued that in a world in which international 
interdependency is highly developed, the treaty-making process seems to have become 
more complicated and a higher legal expertise is required.  However, it is particularly 
interesting to note that FTAs actually triggered the opening of Thailand’s highly 
exclusive treaty-making procedure to the public. This is epoch-making in the sense that 
for the first time the people began to discuss how the treaty-making procedure should be 
conducted.  
On the other hand, this paper has pointed out the problem that the 2007 
constitution vested greater power over treaty-making in the judicial branch, while the 
detailed rules for enforcement had been left absent. The prime task now is the swift 
enactment of the Treaty-making Procedure Bill.  
The government version of the constitutional amendment was approved and 
enacted on 4th March, 2011. Unfortunately, however, it was not possible to prepare 
sufficient information on the amendment for this paper due to time constraints. It would 
seem that further analysis of the legislative process of the amendment and its impact on 
the actual political process is needed in the future.   
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Figure Flow of Treaty-making Procedures 
 Newly added procedure by 2007 constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pre-negotiation 
 
Approved 
Submission of the plan of 
negotiation to the Cabinet by MFA Disclosure of information to the nation 
Cabinet discloses the treaty and of survey report, 
and hold public hearings. 
Cabinet deliberation  
DTA-MFA examines the legal consistency of the treaty. 
Then concerning authorities make translations and submit 
them to the cabinet. 
International negotiation 
Signature 
Deliberation by screening committees of 
 
 
Enactment 
Deliberation in the National Assembly  
examined in the Joint sitting 
Approved 
Approved 
Royal approbation 
The PM should submit ancillary legislation bill 
to the king within 20 days 
Substantial agreement 
Cabinet deliberation 
Ratification（approval ） 
Bi-treaties：exchange of instrument of ratification with 
counter party. 
Muti-treaties：deposit of instrument of ratification 
Royal signature 
Judicial review 
The power of judicial review belongs to the Constitutional 
Court. If there is suspected unconstitutionality in 
treaty-making procedure, more than one-tenth of the total 
member the Assembly submit the opinion to the chairman 
before royal approbation.  Chairman sends it to the 
Constitutional Court 
Pre- signature 
The Cabinet discloses the detail of the treaty 
before signing. 
Source: Jaturon [1996], Visoot [1990], Krom sonthisanya [2004] and the concerning sections in the 
constitutions.  
Note: The figure demonstrates only the flow in which the treaty is approved.  
Post-enactment measure 
In the case that the small and medium entrepreneurs get damages 
caused by implementation of the treaty, the Cabinet has duty to 
compensate or bail out them 
Submission to the National Assembly  
Public notification in 
official gazette 
Deliberation in the National Assembly 
Cabinet gives explanation about the framework of 
negotiation and content of the treaty 
Approved 
Cabinet deliberation 
Consensus building within the government 
DTA-MFA examines the treaty referring to 
domestic/international law and diplomatic/public policy 
and negotiate with other concerning authorities. 
Table Comparison of the contents of 2007 constitution and  
the Draft Amendment by the government 
Source: Sapha phutaenratsadon [2010] 
 2007 Constitution The Government’ Version Draft 
Paragraph 1 The king’s prerogative（to conclude peace accord and other treaties） The king’s prerogative（ to conclude peace accord and other treaties） 
Paragraph 2 Definition of legislative treaty 
a. treaty which changes the Thai territories or the extraterritorial 
areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights  
b. treaty requiring the enactment of an Act for the implementation 
c.  treaty having extensive impacts on national economic or social 
security or generates material commitments in trade, investment 
or budgets or the country 
Definition of legislative treaty 
l change in the Thai territories or the extraterritorial areas over 
which Thailand has sovereign rights 
l requiring the enactment of an Act for the implementation 
 
 
Paragraph 3 Procedures required for negotiation 
l public hearings 
l explanation on the contents of treaty and framework of 
negotiation to the National Assembly 
Treaty requiring ratification following to individual stipulations
treaty having extensive impacts on national economic or social 
security or generates material commitments in trade, investment or 
budgets or the country  
,  
Paragraph 4 Procedures required before/after signature and ratification  
l disclosure of treaty to the public 
l rectification and remedy by the Council of Ministers of the 
impacts of the treaty on the public or operators of small-or 
medium-sized enterprises 
Procedures for the treaty provided in paragraph 3 
l public hearings before conclusion 
l explanation on the contents of threaty and framework of 
negotiation to the National Assembly 
Paragraph 5 Legislation of law concerning, 
l the procedure for the legislative treaty provided in paragraph 
2  
l rectification on the public damaged by the treaty stipulated in 
the paragraph 2  
Procedures for the treaties in paragraph 3 before/ after signature and 
ratification  
l disclosure of treaty to the public 
l rectification and remedy by the Council of Ministers of the 
impacts of the treaty on the public or operators of small-or 
medium-sized enterprises 
Paragraph 6 Judicial Review 
In the case where there arises a problem under paragraph two, the 
power to make the determination thereon shall be vested in the 
Constitutional Court 
Legislation of law concerning, 
l the procedure for the legislative treaty provided in paragraph 3  
l rectification on the public damaged by the treaty stipulated in 
the paragraph 3 
Paragraph 7 
― 
Judicial Review 
In the case where there arises a problem whether the treaty is the one 
provided in the paragraph 2 or 3 or not, the power to make the 
determination thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court 
